In reviewing the cases cited by Plaintiffs and Pak, the briefs and oral argument of counsel, and the clear language of the statute, we join the Sixth and Eighth Circuits in holding that the second sentence in section 216(b), which allows such damages 'as may be appropriate to effectuate the purpose of the retaliation provision', creates a separate, discretionary, standard of damages for retaliation claims. We therefore hold that the retaliation provision of 29 U.S.C. 216(b) gives the district court discretion to award, or not to award, liquidated damages, after determining whether the doing so would be appropriate under the facts of the case.
Appliance Direct, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3047, at * 23.
The Appliance Direct decision also reminds FLSA litigators of the standard for finding a corporate officer individually liable as an employer in a FLSA case:
A corporate officer is personally liable as an FLSA employer if he has 'operational control of a corporation's 'covered enterprise,' which may be involvement of the day-to-day operation of the company or direct supervision of the employee at issue.
Appliance Direct, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3047, at * 6.
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